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Without strong watchdog institutions, impunity becomes the very foundation upon which systems 
of corruptions are built. 
—Rigoberta Menchu Tum, Nobel Prize Laureate 
 
The criminal justice system, like any other system, is run by insiders: prosecutors, judges, deputy 
sheriffs, police, clerks, private defense, and public defenders. But system outsiders—victims, 
witnesses, criminal defendants, and the community in general—have the power to demand respect 
from that same system and to demand that the system work for them. System insiders have no 
monopoly on the knowledge and the power to shape the criminal justice system. In the words of 
the legal scholar and now judge Bibas Stephanos:  
A great gulf divides insiders and outsiders in the criminal justice system. The insiders who 
run the criminal justice system—judges, police, and especially prosecutors—have 
information, power, and self-interests that greatly influence the criminal justice system’s 
process and outcomes. Outsiders—crime victims, bystanders, and most of the general 
public—find the system frustratingly opaque, insular, and unconcerned with proper 
retribution. . . . The gulf clouds the law’s deterrent and expressive messages, as well as its 
efficacy in healing victims; it impairs trust in and the legitimacy of the law. . . . The most 
promising solutions are to inform crime victims and other affected locals better and to give 
them larger roles in criminal justice.1 
But once community members educate themselves, they are able to harness the system and make 
themselves a group that, in order to function, the system must interact with respectfully, 
constitutionally, and with deference. 
Court Watch NOLA believes the criminal justice system has gone astray. Some system 
insiders believe we are too conservative. Other system insiders believe we are too progressive. The 
truth is that Court Watch NOLA is neither. Court Watch NOLA is just you and I. We are 
community, we are New Orleanians. And we know that the criminal justice system has gone astray 
because it is no longer listening to us, the community: a community that has been victimized, a 
community that has witnessed, a community that has been arrested.  
What is Court Watch NOLA not? Court Watch NOLA is not afraid. Court Watch NOLA is 
not afraid of confronting public officials who do not represent the community’s interest. The 
outgoing special agent in charge of the FBI for Louisiana, Jeff Sallet, said of corruption in 
Louisiana: “People don’t want to give up corrupt public officials, often because they’re afraid of 
the consequences.”2 Court Watch NOLA is not willing to stand by corrupt public officials because 
of a previous alliance or friendship, societal standing, or some desire of future favor. Court Watch  
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NOLA is not concerned with being attacked by public officials who refuse to listen to the 
community and who continue to work according to outdated standards with their eyes closed and 
their fingers in their ears. The only fear Court Watch NOLA holds is not sufficiently educating 
voters to ensure that we have political representatives that will hear and represent our voice.  
Court Watch NOLA was created (for the second time) in 2007. We are thirteen years old, and 
with that many years under our belt, we are one of the longest-standing courtwatching programs 
in the country.3 We are not participatory defense. We do not advocate for the defense, nor do we 
try to ensure that any one defense attorney does a better job of defending the interests of her or his 
client. We are not participatory prosecution. We will not argue that someone should get the 
maximum amount of prison time. We are objective, and we never take positions on individual 
cases. Instead, we look at trends in the data we collect as court watchers in open court. If we 
examine individual cases, it is only for the larger purpose of looking at the aggregate trend. 
We are Court Watch NOLA. We are normal community members like you, and we began to 
monitor criminal court because we wanted to take the court back from system insiders. We wanted 
to make sure that the courts are accountable to us, to people who vote (and to those who are barred 
from doing so), to people who demonstrate, to those held hostage by the criminal court system. 
We are more than a hundred people a year who go into court. Sometimes we are described as an 
army of yellow clipboards. And everything changes when we are in court. Judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and police all act differently when we walk into court with our yellow 
clipboards. We are outsiders to the criminal justice system, and the system was not created to 
support outsiders, to listen to outsiders, or to meet the needs of outsiders. Most of us do not 
understand the insider language, and frankly, we are not meant to understand that language. But 
increasingly we are being heard, and the language is starting to change. It has not been without a 
fight. 
This article outlines the history of Court Watch NOLA, New Orleans’ long-standing court-
monitoring program and premier criminal court watchdog group. It outlines the data that Court 
Watch NOLA’s court watchers first collected and the criminal justice atmosphere (national and 
local) that allowed Court Watch NOLA to mature, change, and grow. This article outlines the 
reforms the community demanded after Hurricane Katrina and the reforms demanded by New 
Orleanians today.  
 
The Beginning and the Storm 
Court Watch NOLA started in the chaos that was the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one of the 
waves of reform groups created during this period to change the way New Orleans’ public officials 
would serve the city. Court Watch NOLA joined the Office of the Independent Police Monitor,4 
the Office of the Inspector General,5 the Crime Coalition,6 and others to bring accountability to 
the larger government systems of New Orleans. For many of these new organizations, the New 
Orleans criminal justice system was the target of change. A common refrain after the storm was, 
“Katrina sort of ripped off the Band-Aid—it removed the pretension that the system was 
working.”7  
Many things changed with Hurricane Katrina. The damage caused by Katrina was sizeable. 
The criminal court took in twelve feet of water, badly damaging case files and evidence stored in 
the basement.8 In the end, only 10 percent of evidence was lost. But it took between five hundred 
thousand dollars and one million dollars and a full year to restore all the evidence that had been 
flooded in the basement of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.9 
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Orleans Parish sheriff Marlin Gusman did not evacuate inmates from the Orleans Parish 
Prison before the storm, explaining that he could never have persuaded other sheriffs to house 
thousands of inmates.10 The Orleans Parish Prison building was not badly damaged during the 
storm, but like the Criminal District Court building, Orleans Parish Prison was flooded after the 
storm when the levees broke.11 Sewage began to back up and emergency generators were 
destroyed, causing the prison to lose lights and air circulation in ninety-degree weather.12 Without 
the use of the generators, the electronic cells could no longer be opened or closed.13 When the 
water rose chest-deep on the first floor, guards engaged in “vertical evacuation,” forcing inmates 
who faced traffic and other minor offenses into cells on the higher floors with those who faced 
murder and rape charges.14 When the Louisiana Department of Corrections arrived with boats, it 
carried inmates to an elevated overpass on the nearby interstate and ferried prisoners day and night 
to other jails around the state.15 Many of the inmates who were caught in the flooding in Orleans 
Parish Prison and later evacuated to jails across the state of Louisiana faced only minor 
misdemeanor and traffic offenses.16 Later, when Orleans Parish court officials attempted to find 
these inmates to start court proceedings, they often failed.17 Sheriffs could provide no proper 
records for these inmates because “they just poured out of those flooded jails.”18 It was reported 
that eight thousand detainees awaited proceedings without courts, trials, or lawyers for up to a 
year.19 Inmates languished for months in local jails “doing Katrina time,” serving long past their 
sentences without ever receiving a judicial hearing.20 Louisiana courts suspended habeas corpus 
for six months.21  
The storm had a devastating effect on the District Attorney’s Office building, with the first 
floor taking on three to four feet of water.22 Flooding caused the destruction of many records, and 
the District Attorney’s Office was unable to return to its building for many years.23 Prosecutors 
first worked from home and later at three tables in a downtown hotel before moving into a 
nightclub, where they remained until May 2006.24 When the tax base of the city collapsed, the 
District Attorney’s Office laid off approximately fifty employees, including all investigators. At 
one point, it could not even pay its phone bill.25  
The Orleans Indigent Defender Program, funded primarily by the revenue from traffic tickets 
(and already extremely underfunded before the storm), laid off twenty-five of its thirty-five 
attorneys for budgetary reasons.26 Slowly, key reformers dedicated untold time to help represent 
the thousands of defendants stranded across the state and rebuilt the Public Defender’s Office into 
a system that began to approach the standards of constitutional representation.27  
 
Post-Katrina and the Community Response 
Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans on August 29, 2005.28 The United States has rarely 
experienced such a rapid and complete collapse of local law enforcement, a district attorney’s 
office, the indigent defense system, jails, and criminal courts.29 The first criminal bench trial was 
held more than eight months after the storm, on March 31, 2006.30 The first jury trial was held 
more than ten months after the storm, on June 5, 2006.31 During the subsequent four months, 
approximately fifteen jury trials were held, despite the existence of three thousand pending cases.32 
A year after the storm, prison officials, public defenders, and law school clinic students continued 
to locate hundreds of inmates who had seen neither a lawyer nor a judge since the storm.33 The 
criminal courthouse did not reopen until June 1, 2006.34 Before that, judges presided over cases at 
Hunt Correctional Facility or the New Orleans Greyhound Bus Station (equipped as a jail) until 
December 2005 and then for a short while in the federal courthouse.35 
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Crime in New Orleans went up, and while some city officials argued that the crime rate had not 
increased—since the lower post-Katrina population made the per capita crime rate much larger 
than the same number of crimes would have at pre-Katrina population levels—the New Orleans 
community grew angry and frustrated with the lack of official response to crime.36 Mayor Ray 
Nagin, New Orleans’ third African American mayor, publicly responded that most of the crime 
was “black on black crime.”37 Nagin’s response was widely seen as a bid for the return of tourism 
dollars and an attempt by the mayor to hide his head in the sand.38 Reports of gang activity based 
on turf wars and drugs became widespread, increasing the general fear of the city’s residents.39 
While some in law enforcement were careful to point out that this criminal activity did not involve 
traditional gangs,40 such finite points were lost on the general population.41 Witness intimidation 
was frequently cited as both a cause for the continuation of violent crime and a rationale for 
unsuccessful prosecutions.42 By the end of 2016, New Orleans was the nation’s homicide capital, 
according to FBI statistics, with 63.5 slayings per 100,000 residents, an increase over other 
contenders such as Gary, Indiana, and Detroit.43 
In early June 2006, in what would later be known as the Central City massacre, five teenagers 
were shot dead; the killings were the worst the city had seen in a decade.44 Killed were Marquis 
Hunter, age nineteen; his brother, Arsenio “Lil Man” Hunter, age sixteen; Warren “Luv” Simeon, 
age seventeen; Iraum Taylor, age nineteen; and Reggie “Putty” Dantzler, age nineteen.45 The 
Central City massacre led Governor Kathleen Blanco, at the request of Mayor Nagin, to order the 
National Guard and the State Police into the City of New Orleans.46 In July 2006, District Attorney 
Eddie Jordan arrested Michael Anderson for the quintuple murder but in October 2007 dismissed 
the charges (without telling the victim’s family beforehand), explaining that the evidence was 
contradictory and that their star witness could not be found.47 This move led to more discontent 
against the already very unpopular African American district attorney, and Jordan quickly 
reindicted Michael Anderson after the New Orleans Police Department “found” the star witness 
that the district attorney supposedly failed to locate.48 When the next district attorney, Leon 
Cannizzaro, who was white, was elected by majorities of both black and white voters,49 he made 
history by securing the death penalty against Michael Anderson, New Orleans’ first death penalty 
in twelve years.50 The fact that District Attorney Cannizzaro had efficiently and effectively 
prosecuted and returned a verdict in this high-profile case during his first eight months in office 
provided relief to many New Orleanians, both white and black.51 Only later in 2010, when the case 
against Anderson was overturned, did it come to light that District Attorney Cannizzaro’s office 
had not turned over key evidence to either the court or the defense.52 In 2016, the US Attorney’s 
Office stated in a federal court filing that the New Orleans drug kingpin Telly Hankton, not 
Michael Anderson, had committed the Central City massacre.53 While hindsight seems to indicate 
that Eddie Jordan’s hesitation to prosecute Michael Anderson was appropriate, hesitation over the 
reliability of evidence was not welcome to New Orleanians at the time. New Orleans was being 
barraged by violent crime and the city’s population was infuriated. 
In January 2007, an estimated five thousand people staged a historic rally against violent crime 
in New Orleans.54 The participants, a diverse group, staged the largest demonstration New Orleans 
had seen since the civil rights era.55 In the words of veteran news journalist Gordon Russell, “The 
2007 crime rally was the most significant protest of its kind I’ve seen in 20 years as a journalist in 
New Orleans.” “Thousands of people attended and dozens spoke. It was a completely citizen-
driven event—in fact, public officials mostly weren’t given a chance to speak.”56 The rally was 
organized by the victim-rights group Silence Is Violence57 after two prominent New Orleanians 
were shot and killed. Dinerral Shavers, an African American drummer for the Hot 8 Brass Band, 
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who was a father and a high school teacher, was shot to death while driving in the 6th Ward with 
his family.58 Helen Hill, a white Canadian filmmaker who had moved to New Orleans after the 
storm, was killed in her home in Faubourg Marigny. Her husband, who was also shot while hiding 
in the bathroom holding the couple’s baby, survived.59 Public anger exploded over these high-
profile murders. New Orleans had already seen nine killings in the first eight days of the year.60 
The crowd marched to City Hall and called for the resignations of Mayor Nagin, District Attorney 
Eddie Jordan, and Police Superintendent Warren Riley.61 Glen David Andrews, prominent 
trombonist for the Hot 8 Brass Band, spoke at the rally and thundered at Mayor Nagin, “Get on 
your job”62 but also admitted to the thousands in the crowd that as an African American man, he 
was “scared to death of the police.”63 Andrews had reason to be scared of the New Orleans Police 
Department. Later that fall he was arrested by the police for simply marching in a memorial second 
line; the criminal charges were dropped only months later.64  
Two years after the January 2007 demonstration against violent crime, Silence Is Violence 
held another rally “to express their disgust over the continuing violence in New Orleans, the 
nation’s most murderous city.”65 The names of all the people murdered in the city in the past year 
were read out loud.66 Rather than calling for the resignations of any public officials, the 
demonstration’s organizers announced that the newly elected district attorney, Leon Cannizzaro, 
would be among those gathering on the steps of City Hall.67 The organizers asked “citizens to 
pause and ponder the city’s seemingly intractable crime problem, then make a personal effort to 
improve the community.”68 The tone had changed by 2008, and community outrage at some public 
officials had diminished. 
 
The Movement toward Reform 
This was the beginning. In 2007 New Orleans was starting to get back on its feet and try to make 
sense of the ruins around it. In the middle of the post-Katrina chaos, James Carter was elected to 
the first New Orleans City Council seated after Hurricane Katrina.69 Carter, the second African 
American to serve as a New Orleans city councilman in District C, a historically diverse district, 
would go on to become the first African American criminal justice commissioner in New Orleans’ 
history.70 In 2006, and after the storm, Carter held town halls to, in his words, “better understand 
the problems New Orleans community faced.”71 An African American woman (whose name is 
lost to history) approached Carter at a town hall in Algiers and proposed a community 
courtwatching project that would bring accountability to criminal court.72 The project would show 
the judges, the prosecution, the defense lawyers, the police, and the sheriff that they were being 
watched and they would be held accountable.73 Carter approached Michael Cowan—a white 
academic who had founded Common Good, a group comprising different community 
organizations focused on rebuilding the city—to discuss starting a courtwatching group in New 
Orleans.74 Carter had already begun working with Cowan and other leaders in the white civic and 
business community to coordinate the creation of the Office of the Independent Police Monitor 
inside the Office of the Inspector General.75 
While it always takes a community to get large-scale programs off the ground, it is 
indisputable that the Office of the Independent Police Monitor would never have been created had 
it not been for Councilmember Carter.76 New Orleans became one of the first and remains one of 
the only cities with an independent office responsible for receiving community complaints of 
police abuse and monitoring the use of police force used against the civilian community. The 
Office of the Independent Police Monitor was created as part of the larger Office of the Inspector 
General but with independent decision-making powers.77 The Office of the Inspector General was 
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created to investigate municipal agency corruption.78 While the African American community 
largely supported the creation of the Office of the Independent Police Monitor, the white 
community supported the creation of the Inspector General’s Office. Carter worked with leaders 
of white New Orleans, including Michael Cowan of Common Good, the Business Council, and 
Citizens for 1 Greater New Orleans, to ensure that the combined Inspector General/Independent 
Police Monitor’s office was voted into the New Orleans City Charter by the people of New 
Orleans. 
In many ways Carter was ahead of his time. As a public official, he attempted to 
institutionalize a method to fight the many ways the African American community, either as 
criminal defendants or as crime victims, suffered at the hands of the criminal justice system. Issues 
of inequality remained inextricably tied to the aftermath of Katrina. Orleans Parish’s pre-Hurricane 
situation was equally bleak, however, just less obvious to the rest of the country. New Orleans’ 
pre-Katrina population was 67 percent African American, 28 percent below the poverty line, and 
22 percent without their own transportation.79 
When he came up with the concept of a courtwatching group, Carter saw the purpose of such 
a group as bringing accountability to the public officials of New Orleans criminal courts in two 
major areas: 
1. the disparate treatment of African Americans in the criminal courts compared to their white 
counterparts, and 
2. the stiffness of penalty for nonviolent compared to violent felony offenses.80  
Overall, Carter believed that the transparency provided by a courtwatching program would 
create a better criminal justice system, leading to a safer city for all without regard to race, color, 
or creed.81 These are the issues Carter remembers deliberating before speaking to Cowan about the 
courtwatching concept.82 Cowan credits Carter as the creator of the current Court Watch NOLA 
concept.83 But Carter did not go on to play a part in coordinating the Court Watch NOLA 
organization, aside from speaking to the community about the concept,84 because he saw 
government as having no role to play in coordinating the creation of a courtwatching program.85 
To say that Carter faced an uphill battle in putting his concepts into practice is an 
understatement. Carter remembers facing resistance from in the African American community in 
his efforts to gain legitimacy for many of his concepts,86 though it was often the African American 
community that stood to gain the most from many of those ideas. Carter reached out to Cowan and 
other white leaders in the community with his idea of creating a courtwatching program, his 
objective emanating squarely from the African American community’s experience, in part because 
Carter and Cowan had already been working together to ensure that the Office of the Independent 
Police Monitor and the Office of the Inspector General was successfully voted into the New 
Orleans City Charter.  
Court Watch NOLA did not model its initial objectives on Carter’s concept of examining 
racial inequalities and sentencing disparities between nonviolent and violent crime. Instead, just 
as it does now, Court Watch NOLA as a community program took its energy from where the 
community was the loudest and the most outraged, where the community had started to organize 
as a popular movement. At the time, community outrage was pitted against the upsurge of violent 
crime. 
In New Orleans, great minds think alike even if such minds come from different worlds, 
backgrounds, and perspectives. While Carter was speaking to his African American constituency 
about a courtwatching group and conferring with Cowan, a vibrant and determined civic group, 
largely comprising successful white women, began to convene and ask the pivotal question of how 
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the community could keep the criminal courts accountable. Citizens for 1, Greater New Orleans 
(Citizens for 1) started as and remains today a nonpartisan, nonsectarian grassroots initiative 
formed to fight for the consolidation of the levee boards and assessor system after Katrina; the 
group’s universal demand was for a government “that is open, honest, transparent and 
accountable.”87 The crime-victim advocate and current Court Watch NOLA advisory board 
member Patti Lapeyre, an early member of Citizens for 1, recounts the story of a group of Citizens 
for 1 members gathering information for months and bringing the courtwatching concept back to 
the Citizens for 1 executive board.88 
The concept of courtwatching is as old as the courts themselves. Books have been written 
about prominent criminal trials and the role of the community/audience that makes up the fabric 
of New Orleans history.89 In fact, Court Watch NOLA had already been created (for the first time) 
back in the 1980s.90 Jerome Goldman, a successful entrepreneur who became concerned about the 
lack of accountability of criminal court public officials and the high rate of violent crime in New 
Orleans, created the first Court Watch NOLA.91 Goldman approached the Metropolitan Crime 
Commission,92 one of the few organizations in 1980s New Orleans that focused on the criminal 
courts and the larger criminal justice system.93 At the time that the first Court Watch NOLA had 
begun in the late 1980s, Rafael Goyeneche, a young white former assistant district attorney from 
District Attorney Harry Connick’s office, was just starting to work at the Metropolitan Crime 
Commission.94 Jerome Goldman provided the commission with the funds to create New Orleans’ 
first formal courtwatching program.95 But the Metropolitan Crime Commission was forced to 
discontinue the program eighteen months after it was created, for lack of funding.96 
The fact that two different groups believed that a courtwatching program could be created in 
post-Katrina New Orleans points to the confidence New Orleanians had that it would be 
community alone that would give courts the accountability they needed, for New Orleanians to 
regain confidence in the larger criminal justice system. 
What is certain is that Citizens for 1 put an enormous amount of groundwork into creating 
Court Watch NOLA as an organization; without that groundwork, Court Watch NOLA would not 
have been created at that time in New Orleans. From May 2006 until February 2007, several 
pioneering women, including but not limited to Barbara Bush, Ann Rabin, Linda Roussel, Hope 
Goldman Meyer, Nicole Spangenberg, Erin Hangartner, and Zully Jiminez, came together to start 
meeting with criminal justice stakeholders.97 This was the beginning of Court Watch NOLA. It is 
sound planning on the part of any new not for profit but especially a court watching group to meet 
with stakeholders before launching the concept.98 Every week for nine months this industrious 
group met with various criminal court judges and others, including District Attorney Eddie Jordan 
and his successor, Leon Cannizzaro.99 For twenty years, one member of the group, Zully Jiminez, 
had been the assistant to District Attorney Harry Connick, Eddie Jordan’s immediate 
predecessor.100 According to one Citizen for 1 member, Jiminez was the driving force behind the 
group’s ability to meet with criminal justice stakeholders.101 Patti Lapeyre began attending task 
force meetings at the Louisiana State Supreme Court, gaining entrance through John Casbon, an 
early friend of Court Watch NOLA.102 Around this time, Nicole Spangenberg met with Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving, not to copy its model, but to understand it better.103 Nolan Marshall, who 
was working for Common Good at the time, began to work with Citizens for 1 to help get Court 
Watch NOLA off the ground.104 Together Lapeyre and Marshall wrote letters to all judges, 
councilmembers, and other stakeholders, informing them of the creation of Court Watch NOLA.105 
“Very early on,” Marshall reports, “we wanted to make sure we were devising a program that was 
accepted by the judges, that wasn’t seen as overly critical of any specific aspect of what folks were 
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observing. It was not supposed to be a criticism and review of only judges—we wanted to look at 
everyone: public defenders, prosecutors, defense attorneys. The question was how do we devise 
that, how do we achieve that?”106 
The concept of courtwatching was also discussed at the second or third meeting of the New 
Orleans Crime Coalition, a group formed to think through how to stop violent crime.107 The New 
Orleans Crime Coalition was beginning to look at every aspect of the criminal justice system and 
trying to determine how to restart the gears of the criminal justice system to combat violent 
crime.108 At the time Court Watch NOLA was being discussed, the Crime Coalition was made up 
of Citizens for 1, the Metropolitan Crime Commission, Common Good, Crime Stoppers, the Police 
and Justice Foundation, the Business Council of New Orleans, and the Urban League.109 “The 
whole system,” according to Cowan, “was being broken up and ripped apart at the time. We knew 
that we could not just look at the police department, that we needed to also look at the judges. 
Every part of the criminal justice system was in the hole and Court Watch NOLA was the response 
to the judiciary. There was a light being shed.”110 Carter made formal presentations to Common 
Good and the New Orleans Crime Coalition. In both presentations he did not refer to his specific 
objectives for the program or the data he envisioned the program should collect. Instead, he spoke 
of the overarching concepts of community accountability over the courts in an effort to ensure that 
the universal concept for the program was accepted by the larger (white) community that could 
put the courtwatching program into effect.111  
In the months before Court Watch NOLA hired its first executive director, Marshall, Cowan, 
and a small group of Citizens for 1 members met with Councilmember Carter and Mayor Nagin.112 
Lapeyre remembers hearing Mayor Nagin tell this group of mostly women that it would be “too 
dangerous” for volunteers to watch court and that instead he could have cameras installed in the 
court.113 Lapeyre responded, “No disrespect to you but this is a grassroots effort, and it’s not going 
to be government run.”114 Lapeyre and the others she was working with refused Mayor Nagin’s 
offer of governmental help, a rule to which the group still adheres today.115 Court Watch NOLA 
was launched in February 2007 with initial seed money provided by the Business Coalition, 
Citizens for 1, and Common Good.116  
In 2007, Rafael Goyeneche also provided much-needed help in getting Court Watch NOLA 
off the ground.117 “Raffe spoke very eloquently,” Cowan reports, “about the problems that judges 
caused in the system, the inefficiencies that judges caused, and the need to hold these judges 
accountable.”118 In 2007, the Metropolitan Crime Commission themselves began issuing reports 
that examined the performance of the New Orleans criminal justice system through the police 
department, the District Attorney’s Office, and the judiciary.119 The Metropolitan Crime 
Commission reports continue to examine agencies through the lens of efficiency data, looking at 
the district attorney’s felony arrest-to-conviction rates, each felony judge’s average numbers of 
pending cases, the rate of backlogged cases, and median case-processing time.120 Goyeneche was 
a strong force in ensuring that Court Watch NOLA exclusively examine efficiency data in the New 
Orleans Criminal District Court.121 Goyeneche and the Metropolitan Crime Commission mentored 
Court Watch NOLA as it got on its feet, providing it office space before the Court Watch NOLA 
board member Ellen Yellin, who is still a Court Watch NOLA board member, procured the 
organization its credentials as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization.122 
Another early pioneer of Court Watch NOLA, Hope Goldman Meyer, was invited by 
Goyeneche to be on Court Watch NOLA’s first board of directors.123 Meyer, whose father had 
created the courtwatching project with the Metropolitan Crime Commission in the 1980s, had 
already been working for months with Patti Lapeyre and Citizens for 1 to get Court Watch NOLA 
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off the ground.124 Meyer, who is still an advisory board member, represents the continuum between 
the traditions of courtwatching in the 1980s and the project we have today.125 She was overjoyed 
to be involved with the re-creation of Court Watch NOLA, stating, “It makes perfect sense to hold 
people in power accountable, and in New Orleans it is one of those things that needs to 
continue.“126  
Meyer brought the former prosecutor Lisa Jordan into the process. Lisa Jordan, who is a 
current advisory board member, also represents the continuum between Court Watch NOLA’s 
traditions and its current work. It was her idea to approach Karen Herman, with whom she had 
worked in Harry Connick’s District Attorney’s Office.127 Herman became the first executive 
director of Court Watch NOLA and served in the first half of 2007.128 She was an extremely active 
executive director, speaking on the radio, going to community groups, and recruiting as many 
community volunteers as possible to go into criminal court and collect data.129 
Karen Herman remembers training court watchers one-on-one130 and Lisa Jordan remembers 
conducting trainings in the early days of Court Watch NOLA.131 The first class of court watchers 
was made up of approximately a dozen volunteers.132 Herman reports: “There was a real sense of 
community when the program started. Often it was senior citizens that had the time to sit in court 
during the week, and this group of early court watchers would often get breakfast in my home.”133 
Early court watchers were diverse and Court Watch NOLA began working with some of the 
volunteers Councilmember Carter had brought together from the West Bank of the Mississippi 
River in the Algiers section of New Orleans. According to Nolan Marshal, “We were trying to be 
very conscious about diversity and we got diversity from that group- it was an important part of 
what we’re trying to do.”134 These early court watchers would track individual felony cases, 
usually violent felony or sex offense cases.135 The early court watchers would then go back to their 
community and recruit their fellow community members to be part of the courtwatching 
experience.136 From the beginning, court watchers have been identified by the yellow clipboards 
they carry with them to court.137 Herman spoke with the head of security for the courts in the 
Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office to ensure that court watchers, like court staff, attorneys, and jurors, 
would be allowed to bring their cell phones into court.138 This privilege is not extended to members 
of the general public, witnesses, victims, and criminal defendants.139  
Andrea St. Paul Bland was Court Watch NOLA’s first board chair and served for two years.140 
In a recent interview, she admitted that the membership of that first board was not as diverse as its 
members would have liked. But, she said, “we stacked the first board of directors with former 
assistant district attorneys so we understood criminal court procedures.”141 At the time she became 
Court Watch NOLA’s board chair, Bland was working at Trans-Oceanic with Greg Rusovich, who 
would go on to become chair of the New Orleans Business Council in 2010. Because of this 
relationship, Bland was able to secure funding from the Business Council in the early days of Court 
Watch NOLA. “The Business Council,” she reports, “understood the importance of a safe city, 
they saw the big picture.”142  
 
Court Watch Nola’s Data 
With the data court watchers collected, Karen Herman, assisted by Rafael Goyeneche and the 
Metropolitan Crime Commission, created the first court-watcher reports.143 Without that 
assistance, Herman admits, she would not have been able to create the graphs and put the first 
reports together.144 Under its first three executive directors, Herman, Graham da Ponte, and Janet 
Ahern, Court Watch NOLA, like the Metropolitan Crime Commission, collected data that related 
exclusively to efficiency, with only a limited amount of transparency data. Court watchers 
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collected data on whether criminal court judges arrived late to the bench and how many times and 
why a case was continued without disposition. Other data collected in the early days of the program 
included how often judges would have sidebars, the discussion between the judge and the parties 
conducted at the bench or in judicial chambers and outside of public earshot. 
At the beginning of the program, Court Watch NOLA directed its court watchers to collect 
only efficiency data because of the difficulty and often the failure of the court system to function. 
Additionally, in its early days, Court Watch NOLA operated under the close guidance of the 
Metropolitan Crime Commission, which largely limited itself (and still does) to examining 
efficiency issues in the Orleans Parish Criminal Courts.  
In the early days of the program, Karen Herman always asked court watchers what data they 
wanted to collect.145 In recalling the early days of the program, Karen Herman remembered the 
large rallies and the outrage over the violent crime in the city.146 I talked with Karen Herman and 
Court Watch NOLA’s second board chair Kirk Gasperecz, who still serves on the board today, 
about the Central City massacre, the arrest of Michael Anderson, and the later reports that it was 
Telly Hankton and not Michael Anderson who was responsible for the Central City massacre.147 
In the early days of the program, the community was pushing for the violent crime problem to be 
fixed; the collective consciousness was not centered on ending the increasing number of wrongful 
convictions in Orleans Parish. In fact, at this juncture, the community had largely not yet been 
educated on the incidence of wrongful conviction. This was the environment that Court Watch 
NOLA was born into: a community that was so angry and disgusted that it gathered in the streets 
by the thousands to speak out against violent crime, a community so used to inaction that the 
community embraced the few elected officials who did act.  
Until 2012, Court Watch NOLA remained committed to collecting only efficiency data and 
data relating to the occurrence of sidebars in court. Though Court Watch NOLA’s first mission 
and objectives statement is lost to history, by 2009, executive director Graham daPonte had 
identified as Court Watch NOLA’s core objective: “to promote efficiency within the Criminal 
Court system through monitoring cases involving violent crimes and other cases which are 
significant in indicating the efficiency of the system, and to bring accountability and transparency 
to proceedings within Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.”148 
While objectivity is not the focus of all court watcher programs, a court watching program 
that does prioritize objectivity should measure and compare court performance according to 
national best practices. Judicial think tanks now agree that remaining objective does not 
necessarily mean a court watcher group should examine only efficiency and case processing data. 
Back in 2007, best practices involved examining mainly this type of information. And while 
judicial think tanks were also talking about novel concepts, such as drug courts, and new problem-
solving courts, such as domestic violence court, they were not offering many standards other than 
efficiency by which day-to-day court practices in felony court could be measured. 
In 2003, the National Association for Court Management published its “Core Competency 
Curriculum Guidelines.”149 In 2005, the National Center for State Courts published “Court 
Tools.”150 These two best practices related to efficiency and state court caseflow management.151 
In 2011, Richard Van Duizend and colleagues published Model Time Standards for State Trial 
Courts,152 which became a widely used tool for courts.153 In 2009, David Steelman published 
“Model Continuance Policy,” relating to when and how a case should be delayed.154  
By 2012, this national best-practices trend started to change, with more diverse think tanks 
offering different standards and concepts by which courts could improve and by which the public 
could hold courts accountable. Some of the core standards that had already been developed around 
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efficiency and caseflow management expanded to consider more diverse and layered perspectives. 
The National Association for Court Management, for example, explains the expansion of its best 
practice standards as follows: 
Based on a field of court administration that has become increasingly professionalized and 
diverse, (the National Association of Court Management) NACM reviewed and revised the 
competencies over a three-year period from 2012 [to] 2015, through the financial support 
of the State Justice Institute (SJI). The end product, the Core, represents the multitude of 
changes that have occurred in the profession and is intended to be forward-looking to 
encourage not only competencies for professionals working in the field of court 
administration but also to promote excellence in the administration of justice.155 
While the National Center for State Courts’ “Court Tools” now includes standards that relate 
to access and fairness, ensuring fairness around financial obligations imposed by the court, these 
standards were adopted only later.156 Back when “Court Tools” was first developed in 2005, the 
best practice standards offered to the courts and the public to assess the courts related primarily to 
efficiency: clearance rates, time to disposition, age of active pending caseload, trial date certainty, 
and reliability and integrity of case files.157 These older best practice standards created by the 
National Center for State Courts are the concepts that most directly relate to the data to which 
Court Watch NOLA traditionally limited itself. These standards are still in use on the National 
Center for State Courts website, but unlike fifteen years ago, they are no longer the only standards 
in use.  
David Steelman, vice president of the National Center for State Courts, is one of the most 
prolific writers of judicial efficiency and caseflow management literature in the country. In 2011, 
after working at the center for almost two decades,158 he published the results of his study on the 
appropriateness of the Metropolitan Crime Commission’s judicial efficiency reports in New 
Orleans.159 In my interview with him by phone, he admitted that his views on court best practices 
have evolved: 
I have shifted my focus from efficiency to judicial accountability in other areas. When we 
look only at judicial efficiency, we miss the critical bottom line. An analysis of courts that 
only includes efficiency standards creates holes in the resources we collectively have 
available to us to determine judicial and court accountability. How do we know justice is 
being done? How do we ensure fair outcomes are reached with the resources we have? If 
you are a person of color, you often end up on the short end of the stick when it comes to 
outcomes, even when you measure cases apples to apples. How does an efficiency-only 
analysis cover any of these real questions?160 
Like the national judicial think tanks in their reports of best practices, Court Watch NOLA 
also began to evolve in the data it collected. When its fourth executive director, Brad Cousins, took 
over the organization in 2012, he began studying the newest best practices lauded in the national 
think tanks and in 2014 introduced court watchers (and court stakeholders: the judges, prosecutors, 
defense, sheriff deputies, clerks of court and police) to the concepts of procedural fairness.161 
Procedural fairness is an evidence-based practice that requires judges to pay attention to creating 
fair outcomes and tailor their actions, language, and responses to the public’s expectations of 
providing a fair process. There are four basic expectations in procedural fairness: the ability of a 
party to participate in the case by expressing their viewpoint; neutrality of the judge; respectful 
treatment of a person’s rights; and the care and sincerity that authorities show in trying to help the 
litigants.162 In 2013, the year before Court Watch NOLA was implementing procedural fairness 
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concepts into its data collection, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State 
Court Administrators jointly adopted a resolution encouraging state court leaders to promote the 
implementation of procedural fairness principles.163 I asked former executive director Cousins 
what had changed at the time Court Watch NOLA began to collect data on procedural fairness, 
and he replied, “I think that nationally and locally the criminal justice system was starting to be 
seen differently at that point, starting to be seen more holistically.”164 
 
Court Watch NOLA’S Recent Progress and Remaining Challenges 
In the summer of 2015, I became the fifth executive director of Court Watch NOLA. A lot had 
changed since the program was created. The first executive director, Karen Herman, had already 
been a sitting judge for seven years.165 Hurricane Katrina’s ten-year anniversary was around the 
corner. Vera New Orleans’ Pretrial Services Program, which sought to objectively assess the risk 
of pretrial release for criminal defendants, was being widely debated, challenged, opposed, and 
changed. Later it would be adopted by the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.166 After a 
laudable amount of healthy public dialogue, the New Orleans Police Department had been placed 
under and largely benefited from the most extensive consent decree ever written in the United 
States.167 Between 2011 and 2013, while the police department was under the consent decree, it 
was revealed that the department had routinely failed to investigate hundreds of reported sex 
crimes.168 The Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, after various deaths and suicides in its jail,169 was 
also placed under a consent decree170 but with significantly less progress to report. Orleans Parish 
became the parish or county with the highest recorded wrongful conviction rate per capita of any 
county or parish in the country with a population greater than three hundred thousand.171 Louisiana 
became the highest state incarcerator per capita in the country,172 and had the second highest 
female homicide rate in the country.173 On a national level, President Barack Obama became the 
first sitting president to visit a federal prison.174 President Obama commuted the sentences of more 
people than the previous ten presidents combined, allowed incarcerated people to once again 
receive Pell Grants to pursue college degrees, issued an executive order “banning the box” on 
federal job applications, released new Housing and Urban Development guidelines stating that 
denial of housing on the basis of a criminal record would be considered a violation of the Fair 
Housing Act, and banned solitary confinement of juveniles in federal prisons.175 President 
Obama’s White House issued a white paper that criticized the inequities and inefficiencies of fines, 
fees, and bail.176 In 2011, the US Department of Education issued a letter to universities 
recommending various methods intended to reduce incidents of sexual assault on campuses, in 
response to charges that schools had poorly supported women who complained of sexual assault.177 
By 2015, five states had legalized recreational marijuana and twenty-four states had legalized 
medical marijuana;178 by the time of writing this paper, many of these numbers have changed once 
again. The #Me Too movement emanating from the sexual abuse allegations against Harvey 
Weinstein demanded that the community regard sexual assault and sexual harassment with a 
degree of seriousness it had previously not.179 
Why are all of these changes in our criminal justice system important and why do I list them? 
These changes are important not just because they have impacted those most affected by the 
criminal justice system. These changes are important because as a community both locally and 
nationally, we have fought for them. As we have made changes to the criminal justice system, we 
have evolved in our understanding. While we have debated and fought for these changes, we have 
also changed. We have pushed our public officials to embrace and make these changes to the 
criminal justice system. Public officials who had not heard the drumbeat of progress and did not 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
13 
 
understood the best practice standards created by learned experts in the field have been replaced 
or soon will be. Both Republican and Democratic public officials have made changes related to 
reducing incarceration and improving the treatment of crime victims. New Orleanians have 
engaged in this dialogue, and fewer now are willing to be kept in the dark on criminal justice 
issues. New Orleans is absolutely engaged in the criminal justice conversation and we have the 
right to be proud of that accomplishment. 
Court Watch NOLA still collects data on efficiency in criminal district court, still seeing 
efficiency, case processing, and the time the public must wait to receive their day in court as 
important data on which to report. But, as the national best practice standards dictate, we collect 
other data that paints a larger picture of the practices seen in the New Orleans criminal courts. 
Thus, Court Watch NOLA has come full circle back to some of the original concepts 
Councilmember James Carter envisioned for the group.  
In 2016, with funding from a grant awarded by a local foundation, Baptist Community 
Ministries, Court Watch NOLA began to monitor bail hearings in New Orleans Magistrate Court. 
In doing so, Court Watch NOLA became the first and only group recording data in magistrate 
court, such as the amount of bail set, the number of conditions required of the defendant before he 
or she is released pretrial, the demographics of the defendant, and whether the bail hearing was 
conducted without legal counsel (among other data collected). Again with the help of Baptist 
Community Ministries, Court Watch NOLA began to monitor New Orleans Municipal 
(misdemeanor) Court to ensure that criminal defendants had legal counsel during their court 
appearances. In New Orleans Municipal Court, court watchers also collect data on the number of 
fines and fees assessed by the court on criminal defendants. Having been informed by the 
Innocence Project of New Orleans that one of the consistent factors observed in wrongful 
conviction cases is the lack of scientific or hard evidence, Court Watch NOLA began collecting 
data on the frequency hard or scientific data is used to prosecute criminal cases. The group also 
collected data on victim rights and witness intimidation in all three courts, whether victims were 
present, how they were being treated by the stakeholders in Criminal District Court, and whether 
there were allegations of witness intimidation.  
All of this data was supported by best practices on the national level. The National Center for 
State Courts had already featured the “Model Pre-Trial Services Implementation Kit” on its 
website, as well as various court best practice guides relating to creating bias-free environments.180 
President Donald Trump’s Department of Justice was providing jurisdictions with grant money to 
ensure that the constitutional right to counsel was ensured, and where it was not ensured, that it 
was assessed and was implemented at the local and state levels.181 Right-to-counsel standards were 
created and are listed on the American Bar Association website. Finally, the movement for victim 
rights had become a practical revolution. In November 2018, voters in five states decided on ballot-
initiated victim-rights amendments.182 The National Center for State Courts, the Center for Court 
Innovation, and the American Bar Association all list best practice standards relating to victim 
rights on their websites.183  
On March 7, 2017, Court Watch NOLA founding board member and victim rights advocate 
Patti Lapeyre and I wrote a letter to the editor of the New Orleans Advocate, decrying the unequal 
treatment some crime victims receive in the New Orleans criminal courts if they do not know the 
right people or if their perpetrator happens to know the right people.184 In its 2016 report, Court 
Watch NOLA had reported that 73 percent of crime victims in police reports were African 
American and 60 percent of crime victims were women.185  
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Also, in 2016, Court Watch NOLA approached District Attorney Cannizzaro along with crime 
victim advocates Mary Claire Landry and Eva Lessinger to ask the District Attorney’s Office to 
no longer request that sex crime and domestic violence survivors if they did not appear in court to 
testify against their perpetrators. Though for years crime survivors and their advocates had been 
begging District Attorney Cannizzaro behind closed doors to end the policy of incarcerating crime 
survivors for failure to testify,186 he had continued to incarcerate crime survivors. When confronted 
with Court Watch NOLA’s and victim advocates’ opposition to this practice in 2016, Cannizzaro 
had politely but firmly refused to cease the practice. Several months later, after giving notice to 
Cannizzaro and his office, Court Watch NOLA published the (minimum) number of crime 
survivors Cannizzaro had pushed to incarcerate for failure to prosecute, including a rape crime 
survivor who had been incarcerated for nine days for failure to testify against the man who had 
raped her.187 Also at this time, it was revealed that Cannizzaro had been signing documents that 
threatened jail time and fines for those victims and witnesses who did not cooperate with his office 
and calling such documents subpoenas,188 when in reality, only judges (and certainly not 
prosecutors) can sign subpoenas in Louisiana.189  
This news was first published in New Orleans by The Lens,190 went international with the 
BBC,191 and finally hit all major national print publications including the New York Times,192 the 
Washington Post,193 the Miami Herald,194 and the Full Frontal Show with Samantha Bee.195 As a 
result of Court Watch NOLA’s releasing its data and the ensuing news coverage, four separate 
civil rights lawsuits196 and two city council resolutions197 have been brought against Cannizzaro. 
After the revelation of Cannizzaro’s incarceration of crime survivors, 48 percent of white voters 
and 43 percent of black voters responded to a poll with an unfavorable opinion of Cannizzaro.198 
Cannizzaro’s treatment of crime victims has stubbornly remained in the news for over four 
years,199 despite Cannizzaro’s personal criticism of whomever raises the subject. Cannizzaro’s 
endorsement of candidates running for election, often as judges, used to result in a win at the 
polls.200 But since his public refusal to stop incarcerating crime victims, three out of four electoral 
candidates he has endorsed201 have lost their election;202 this group includes the front runner in the 
2017 mayoral election and a talented and popular judge who lost once Cannizzaro endorsed her,203 
despite her having more money in her war chest than her opponents.204 In one of the biggest 
demonstrations relating to criminal justice seen since 2007, approximately a hundred people 
gathered in front of the New Orleans Criminal District Court, led in song by the popular singer 
and New Orleans resident Ani DiFranco, to protest Cannizzarro’s treatment of crime victims.205 A 
few days later a smaller group, made up of crime victims, gathered to protest in front of the District 
Attorney’s Office, only to be mocked on Twitter by the District Attorney Office’s public 
information officer.206 In 2019, the State of Louisiana passed legislation making it more difficult 
for a Louisiana district attorney to incarcerate sex crime and domestic violence survivors for failure 
to testify against their aggressors.207 Throughout the Louisiana state legislative process, I was 
consistently told that Cannizzaro’s office was the only District Attorney’s Office in Louisiana that 
incarcerates sex crime survivors and domestic violence survivors. Finally, in a twist of irony, the 
director of Silence Is Violence became a plaintiff in one of the civil rights suits against Cannizzaro 
because of his persistent threat that he would incarcerate her for her work with crime survivors.208 
In 2007, Silence Is Violence had organized the biggest criminal justice rally New Orleans had seen 
in fifty years209 that in many ways led to the election of Cannizzaro as district attorney. A year 
later the group promoted Cannizzaro at a rally on the steps of City Hall at their rally.210  
For the work that Court Watch NOLA has done advocating for victims’ rights standards, 
Cannizzaro has publicly attacked the organization and me, in my role as executive director, several 
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times. For example, in a press conference Cannizzaro called, he said that I had “betrayed Court 
Watch NOLA’s rich history as an objective and unbiased watchdog.”211 As a sign that times have 
changed and that the community will continue to demand change, the editorial board of the one 
media outlet that reported on the press conference responded swiftly and without solicitation from 
Court Watch NOLA, stating:  
In a press conference after the council meeting, Mr. Cannizzaro blasted Court Watch 
NOLA as an “anti-law enforcement, anti-prosecution, anti-public safety group.” That isn’t 
true. Court Watch NOLA, which was created shortly after Hurricane Katrina, is made up 
of volunteers who donate their time to watch court proceedings and make sure the justice 
system is ethical, transparent and professional. . . . He should just agree not to lock up 
another victim of sexual assault or domestic violence, rather than attempting to discredit 
the organization urging him to do the right thing.212 
Since Court Watch NOLA released its report first identifying the problematic process of 
incarcerating crime survivors to compel them to testify, Court Watch NOLA has produced other 
reports that made national news. One such report reveals a criminal court judge who required 
criminal defendants to wear ankle monitors, sometimes for up to a year, steering them to use his 
campaign contributor’s ankle-monitoring company, which charges criminal defendants ten dollars 
a day for the use of the monitors. Compounding the injustice, that same judge threatened 
defendants with jail if they did not pay his campaign contributor the money they could not afford 
to pay for the ankle monitors the judge required them to wear.213 Court Watch NOLA has also 
reported that the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office records confidential attorney-client phone calls, 
providing the recordings to the prosecution, which uses them in their case-in-chief against the 
defendants.214 When Court Watch NOLA asked the Orleans Parish sheriff to stop recording 
confidential attorney-client phone calls, the sheriff replied that the his office had always made such 
recordings and he saw no reason to change this practice.215  
While we still have a long way to go in changing the practices of some criminal justice 
stakeholders, Court Watch NOLA has made an immense amount of progress, most readily seen in 
the degree of public discourse and the community’s level of education on criminal justice issues 
in New Orleans and outside of our city. Court Watch NOLA has worked with thirty-three different 
groups around the country that wanted to start programs, resulting in six successfully launched 
courtwatching programs. In New Orleans, Court Watch NOLA has educated thousands of court 
watchers. Court watchers are diverse in every sense of the word. They are black, white, Hispanic, 
Asian, old, young, rich, poor, angry, naive, optimistic, pessimistic, and previously impacted. Court 
Watch NOLA has taught students who will become our future prosecutors, police captains, 
sheriffs, defense attorneys, and judges about national best practice standards and the importance 
of public perception and public confidence in the criminal courts. The insiders to the system—the 
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police, and deputy sheriffs—now read our reports in a way 
they never have done before. When these insiders, the institutional stakeholders, change their 
practices to comport with best practices, Court Watch NOLA commends them, as it has 
commended the chief of police and the chief judge of Criminal District Court, among others. Those 
who refuse to follow national best practices and those who believe that assessment of our courts 
should be based on efficiency and caseload management standards alone do not see the 
handwriting on the wall. The public continues to educate itself, and those who do not listen to the 
public will face defeat at the polls. History waits for no one. The community will continue to 
demand accountability and criminal justice reform from our public officials. Change will come on 
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